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NOTE 
"Electronic Fingerprints": Doing Away with the 
Conception of Computer-Generated 
Records as Hearsay 
Adam Wolfson* 
INTRODUCTION 
"Every statement has a dual nature, it is both a fact and the assertion of 
fact, and on the guise in which it appears depends whether it is original evi­
dence or hearsay, the respectable Dr. Jekyll is received with a becoming 
respect, but the disrespectable Mr. Hyde is kicked ignominiously out of 
court."1 
One night, in the hours just before daybreak, the computer servers at 
Acme Corporation's headquarters quietly hum in the silence of the office's 
darkened hallways. Suddenly, they waken to life and begin haphazardly sift­
ing through their files. Several states away, a hacker sits in his room, 
searching through the mainframe via an internet connection. His attack is 
quick-lasting only a short five minutes-but the evidence of invasion is 
apparent to Acme's IT employees when they come in to work the next 
morning. 
Nearly a year later, federal prosecutors bring suit in the federal district 
court against the person they believe to be the hacker. During the trial, sev­
eral witnesses testify about the attack and its resulting damage. The only 
piece missing is the hacker's identity. In order to prove this, the prosecution 
wishes to introduce the mainframe's records of the attack, which document 
both the source of the invasion and the signature of the computer that con­
ducted the entire event. A cursory check by computer specialists matched 
these records with the accused hacker's personal computer. 
The prosecutors lay sufficient foundation to authenticate the records and 
then move to have them admitted into evidence. 
"Objection!" states the defense counsel. 
"On what grounds?" replies the judge. 
"Hearsay, your Honor. The computer records the prosecution is attempting 
to introduce do not satisfy the business records exception under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 803(6). They were created in response to an attack, and were not 
maintained in the ordinary course of business. Consequently, they cannot be 
admitted under the Rules of Evidence and must be deemed inadmissible." 
* J.D. candidate, December 2005, University of Michigan Law School. Special thanks to Pro­
fessor Orin Kerr of George Washington University Law School for both help on the topic idea of this 
Note as well as his continuing input on its development throughout the writing process. 
I. J.B.C. TREGARTHEN, THE LAW OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE 10-11 (1915). 
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The judge directs his attention to the prosecution. 
"Counsel, are there any other exceptions these records fall under?" 
"No, your Honor." 
"Objection sustained." 
This result may seem inequitable, but it is entirely possible given the 
current majority view on the nature of computer-generated records. 
In order to understand this conception, it is important to first lay out 
what constitutes hearsay, the rationale for the rule, and the exceptions for 
computer-generated records. Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted."2 At its heart, the hearsay rule 
merely aims to exclude unreliable evidence at trial.3 This "unreliability" is 
considered to be a product of several factors: (1) hearsay evidence is often 
not the best evidence of a fact because more direct statements or other evi­
dence have far more probative value; (2) a hearsay statement is almost never 
made under oath; (3) other parties do not have a chance to cross-examine 
the maker of a hearsay statement; and (4) with a hearsay statement, the 
judge and jury do not get an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the 
declarant for credibility purposes. 4 
American courts do not admit hearsay because it generally creates an 
unreliable "chain of inferences" that is unacceptable when the aim of a trial 
is accurate fact finding.5 Most inaccuracies are the result of "the four testi­
monial infirmities of ambiguity, insincerity, faulty perception, and erroneous 
memory."6 Another danger hearsay raises is that it allows juries to take the 
statement in question out of context, which can completely change the 
2. FED. R. Evrn. 801(c). A "statement" is "(I) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal con­
duct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." FED. R. Evrn. 80 I (a). A "declarant" is "a 
person who makes a statement." FED. R. Evm. 801(b). 
3. See Lilly V. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999); IRVING YOUNGER, HEARSAY: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE THROUGH THE THICKET 201 (1988) (stating that hearsay is only a rule against unreliable evi­
dence); G. MICHAEL FENNER, THE HEARSAY RULE 4-5 (2003) ("Underneath it all, truth is the objective 
of the hearsay rule: The hearsay rule is about keeping out evidence that is so unreliable that it does not 
help us find the truth."). 
4. ANDREW L.-T. CHOO, HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 11-13 {1996). 
These four factors are applicable in a variety of ways, each having more weight than the others depend­
ing on the case. Factors {I), (2) and (3) are the historical rationales for the rule. Id. at 11. Factor (4) has 
only recently risen to prominence as an accepted reason for upholding the rule as a whole. Id. 
5. Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REv. 957, 958 (1974). Tribe's analy­
sis parallels that of CHOO, supra note 4, but goes a step further in describing the fallacies of eyewitness 
testimony in general. Tribe, supra, at 957-61. This, along with a triangular graph included in the article, 
helps to create a "heuristic device" for understanding the problems associated with admitting hearsay 
statements into evidence. Id. 
6. Tribe, supra note 5, at 958. These four infirmities refer to the general problems with any set 
of in-court testimony. "Ambiguity" refers to statements that need clarification and can be misconstrued 
on a subsequent retelling. CHOO, supra note 4, at 84. "Insincerity," as the label implies, is the "deliberate 
lies" some declarants tell in order to alter others' perceptions of the facts. Id. "Faulty perception" and 
"erroneous memory" are both phenomena that occur as a matter of course in eyewitness testimony. Id. 
For further discussion of these "hearsay dangers," please see CHOO, supra note 4. 
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character of the assertion.7 Because in-court analysis of testimony largely 
remedies these infirmities, we rightfully exclude hearsay evidence.8 
With this logic in mind, it is clear why assertive documents and most 
types of records are textbook examples of hearsay. After all, a "statement" 
does not always have to be oral.9 If the document is introduced because its 
proponent claims that the information contained therein is true, it is the 
written equivalent of an oral assertion and must therefore meet a valid 
h • IO earsay exception. 
When introducing computer-generated documents, lawyers most com­
monly use the business records exception.11 An extension of the historical 
"shopbook rule,"12 this exception was a response to the advent of the cor­
porate form, which created a heretofore unseen phenomenon: a trial where 
no physical person was being sued.13 Since testimony of the corporation's 
inner workings necessarily incorporated voluminous business records, 
courts battled with the problem of a rigid hearsay rule that had no true on­
point exceptions.14 In 1936, the Commonwealth Fund Act15 offered the first 
codification of the business records exception.16 The Act's proponents ar­
gued that unaltered business records were unusually reliable because 
businesses themselves rely on these records for day-to-day operations.17 
7. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994). 
8. See Tribe, supra note 5, at 960-{51. 
9. FED. R. Evm. 80l(a). 
10. Id.; FENNER, supra note 3, at 10 (stating that conduct may be a "statement" if the actor in­
tends it to be such). 
11. FED. R. Evrn. 803(6); Ronald J. Marzullo-La Russa, Computer-Generated Evidence: Admis­
sibility, 20 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 121, 129 (1985). 
12. RICHARD 0. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, TRAN­
SCRIPTS AND CASES 603 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter LEMPERT ET AL.]. According to LEMPERT ET AL., 
[T]he "shopbook rule" is rooted in the early English custom that allowed a merchant doing business 
on account to enter his books into evidence to prove the defendant owed him money. 
To ensure reliability, different jurisdictions required one or more of the following guarantees: (1) a 
"supplemental oath" taken by the merchant as to the justness of his accounts, (2) inspection by the 
court to determine if the books were fairly kept in the regular course of business, (3) testimony that 
the merchant kept honest books, and (4) proof apart from the books that at least some portion of the 
goods charged to an account had been actually delivered. 
Id.; see also JoHN w. STRONG, 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 285, at 249-50 (5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter 
McCORMICK]. 
13. See YOUNGER, supra note 3, at 111-13 (discussing the effect of the Industrial Revolution and 
increased need for business records on evidentiary necessities and rules). 
14. Id. 
15. Federal Business Records (Commonwealth Fund) Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (2000). 
16. FED. R. Evrn. 803 advisory committee's note. 
17. Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 787 F.2d 1429, 1433--34 (10th Cir. 1986) ('The 
business records exception is based on a presumption of accuracy, accorded because the infonnation is 
part of a regularly conducted activity, kept by those trained in the habits of precision, and customarily 
checked for correctness, and because of the accuracy demanded in the conduct of the nation's business."). 
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Congress, commentators; and courts agreed with this rationale's persua-
• 18 d th A d "th . 19 s1veness, an e ct passe w1 mmor controversy. 
The modern version of the exception deems a "memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation" admissible if it is "kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity."20 This is a very broad rule21 because 
the term "business" includes any "business, institution, association, pro­
fession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted 
for profit."22 Examples of this broadness in practice include courts admit­
ting as "business records" a blackjack dealer's tip log23 and calendar 
notations of daily illegal drug sales.24 
The other major exception under which computer records are admitted 
is the public records exception.25 Under this exception, records must origi­
nate from "public offices or agencies"26 and set forth ( 1) the activities of 
the office, (2) matters observed· as part of office employees' jobs, or 
(3) factual findings resulting from an investigation conducted by the office.27 
This exception is predicated on the belief that (1) public records are just as 
trustworthy as business records because the government relies on them for 
proper functioning, (2) public employees usually record their activities prop­
erly, and (3) government employees are unlikely to remember details 
independent of the record.28 Foundation of the records' admissibility, as with 
18. FED. R. Evrn. 803 advisory committee's note. 
19. Id. 
20. FED. R. Evm. 803(6). Courts have long held computer records admissible as business re­
cords, given the proper foundation. See, e.g., United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 452 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(requiring that computer records satisfy the business records exception); Hardison v. Balboa Ins. Co., 4 
Fed. Appx. 663, 669 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that computer records need to be verified pursuant to Fed­
eral Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 901); United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910, 914 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding 
that part of computer records introduced at trial were business records); United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 
1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that computer records must satisfy the business records exception 
before being admitted); United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553, 1559 (I Ith Cir. 1985) (setting the situa­
tions in which computer records may be admitted as business records); Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer 
Co., 542 F.2d 111, 125 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (explaining that the business 
records exception is legitimately applied to computer evidence). The foundation is laid when the party 
seeking to admit the records (1) introduces evidence that the computer program is sufficiently accurate 
for reliability purposes, and (2) establishes that the business relied on the records for day-to-day opera­
tions. Salgado, 250 F.3d at 453. The party need not provide expert testimony as to the mechanical 
accuracy of the program. Id. Instead, proper foundation and a witness on the stand who is a legitimate 
representative of the business and is familiar with the business' recordkeeping practices will suffice for 
business records purposes. Id. at 451-52; Hardison, 4 Fed. Appx. at 669; Miller, 771 F.2d at 1237. 
21. 2 McCORMICK, supra note 12, § 288. 
22. 2 ld. 
23. Keogh v. Comm'r oflntemal Revenue, 713 F.2d 496 (9thCir. 1983). 
24. United States v. Lizotte, 856 F.2d 341 (1st Cir. 1988). 
25. FED. R. EVID 803(8); Marzullo-La Russa, supra note 11, at 130-31. 
26. FED. R. Evm 803(8). 
27. Id. 
28. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note. The logical extension of this rationale is that 
public officials have an inordinately large number of records to maintain. It is nearly impossible to expect 
them to remember what would normally be just another number or figure entered into the ledger. Conse-
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business records, may be established by a layperson representative of the gov-
29 emment agency. 
A third conceivably applicable exception under which computer records 
may be admitted is the "residual" provision found in Federal Rule of Evi­
dence ("FRE") 807 if there are sufficient "circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness" and the piece of hearsay is offered as evidence of a material 
fact without causing undue prejudice against the opposing party.30 A hearsay 
proponent who employs this exception must give opposing parties "a fair op­
portunity" to prepare for the evidence's inclusion in the record. 31 
Unfortunately for parties who have no other recourse but FRE 807, this 
"catch-all" exception is seldom employed because judges are uncomfortable 
with its extremely powerful and flexible nature.32 
Almost all federal courts,33 and many state courts, regard all computer 
records as hearsay that may only be admitted under the business records34 or 
public records exceptions.35 These courts follow the dissent in Penna Re­
search v. Singer Co., a 1976 Second Circuit decision that considered the 
quently, courts are willing to trust public records because (I) there is a presumption towards trusting 
government sans evidence to the contrruy, (2) public officials have little incentive to lie when keeping 
their records, (3) these records are necessary for governmental functions and, as a result, are more likely 
to be accurate, and ( 4) there are very few other ways that the records would be admitted even though they 
have potentially high probative value. See id. 
29. See United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that custodians of 
computer records need not be intimately familiar with their programs in order to still offer proper founda­
tion for the evidence). 
30. FED. R. Evm. 807. 
31. Id. 
32. See CHARLES B. GIBBONS, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH TuiAL OBJECTIONS 129-35 
(2003); Russo v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., No. CIV.A.94-195, 1998 WL 967568, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 
1998) ("A catch-all rule such as Rule 807 must be sparingly invoked, lest its potential breadth swallow 
the carefully crafted narrowness of the enumerated exceptions."). Of the major cases involving computer 
records in federal courts, not one instance exists where such records were admitted under the residual 
exception. The only case-state or federal-that discusses the relationship between computer records 
and FRE 807, Russo, seems to suggest that computer records could legitimately be admitted under this 
Rule, but only after the proponent party demonstrates the records in question possess a very high level of 
trustworthiness. See id. at *3. 
33. United HealthCare Corp. v. Am. Trade Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Pendergrass, 47 F.3d 1166 (4th Cir. 1995); Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. B.R.I. Coverage 
Corp., 38 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 
1991); United States v. Spine, 945 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015 
(5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Miller, 771F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Glasser, 773 
F.2d 1553 (I Ith Cir. 1985); United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States 
v. Liebert, 519 F.2d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 1975). The only two federal cases that take the opposite view 
are United States v. Rollins, No. ACM34515, 2004 WL 26780 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 24, 2003) 
and United States v. Duncan, 30 M.J. 1284 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1990). The U.S. Supreme Court 
has not addressed the issue. 
34. FED. R. Evm. 803(6). Computer-generated records introduced at trial are often printouts 
which purport to show that a party called a certain telephone number or used a certain credit card. 
See, e. g. , United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 452 (6th Cir. 2001). 
35. FED. R. Evm. 803(8). Federal courts have been quick to admit governmental computer 
records under this Rule. See, e. g . ,  United States v. Spine, 945 F.2d 143, 149 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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admission of computer simulations of anti-skid devices.36 Noting various 
hearsay sources Perma Research's experts relied upon in analyzing the 
simulations' results and conclusions, Judge Van Graafeiland stated in his 
dissent that he was "not prepared to accept the product of a computer as the 
equivalent of the Holy Writ."37 Further, he argued that computers' "ability to 
package hearsay and erroneous or misleading data in an extremely persua­
sive format" required that computer evidence satisfy a hearsay exception in 
order to be admitted.38 Judge Van Graafeiland's solution contained two ap­
proaches: ( 1) for computer records submitted as business records, simply 
use the business records exception; and (2) when a computer program is 
used to produce information specifically for litigation, require the proponent 
party to make the computer program in question available to the opposing 
party before trial. 39 
Notably absent in Judge Van Graafeiland's analysis is the possibility that 
computer evidence might not represent human assertions and therefore not 
constitute hearsay. The issue of computer-generated data, such as the IP log 
at Acme Corp., was not addressed in the case. Considering Penna was de­
cided in 1976, when personal computer technology was only beginning to 
develop,40 it is likely that the court was not aware of such records. 
Almost all federal courts and most state courts apply Judge Van 
Graafeiland's analysis to all computer records, regardless of source.41 These 
courts are stuck in a hearsay rut; while they often rightly define the records 
42 as computer-generated--or, at least use the words "computer-generated" -
the final logical step on why self-generated records are not hearsay is never 
reached.43 
36. 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976). The case revolved around a dispute regarding two contracts 
for automotive anti-skid devices. One of the issues at trial was whether the devices performed prop­
erly, and Penna Research introduced computer simulations that presumably showed that the devices 
did not function well. On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the simulations and the experts them­
selves. 
37. Id. at 121 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). 
38. Id. at 126 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (quoting Jerome J. Roberts, A Practitioner's 
Primer on Computer-Generated Evidence, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 254, 279 (1974)). 
39. Id. at 125 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). 
40. Ken Poisson, Chronology of Personal Computers, at http://www.islandnet.com/ 
-kpolsson/comphist/ (last updated July 26, 2005). 
41. See cases cited supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
42. United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 452 (6th Cir. 2001) (" [T]he admission of com­
puter-generated toll and billing records made . . .  "); United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 909 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (" [T]he government introduced computer-generated Western Union money transfer re­
cords."); United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553, 1559 (I Ith Cir. 1985) ("Computer generated 
business records are admissible under the following circumstances . . .  ") (list omitted); United States 
v. Fusero, 106 F. Supp. 2d 921, 924 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (" As the Court stated during the trial . .. 
computer-generated records . . .  are admissible at trial pursuant to [FRE] 803(6). "). 
43. See Cestnik, 36 F.3d at 909 (holding computer-generated records admissible because 
they were used to show the amount and origin of fraudulent bank transfers and because they satis­
fied the business records exception); United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209, 216 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The 
record was generated automatically . . . as records of outgoing telephone calls regularly are . . . . In 
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Applying the hearsay exceptions outlined above to computer records 
means that business records generated in the regular course of business and 
governmental agency computer records will almost always be admitted at 
trial. Records that do not fit neatly into these categories, however, are left in 
an uncertain void where, depending on a court's view of the matter, they 
may be admitted or just as easily denied.44 Fortunately, courts seem to im­
plicitly recognize that many types of computer records should be allowed 
into evidence, and often find some way to admit such data under another 
h . 45 earsay except10n. 
A minority of states employ a more nuanced view of computer records 
and take a vastly different stance on such records' admissibility.46 Impor­
tantly, these states distinguish between computer-stored records and 
computer-generated records,47 and maintain that computer-generated records 
any event, telephone records are business records for the purposes of [FRE] 803(6)."); United States 
v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that computer-generated records are poten­
tial hearsay because they constitute "writings"); United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553, 1559 (I Ith 
Cir. 1985) (setting out the various situations where computer-generated records are admissible, all of 
which are traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule); Fusero, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 924-25 (allowing 
computer-generated records into the record because they were kept in the ordinary course of busi­
ness). 
44. An example of the danger posed by submitting computer records to a hearsay analysis is 
found in United States v. Blackbum, 992 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1993). In that case, computer-generated 
records denoting the prescription of a pair of glasses left at the scene of a crime were found to not 
satisfy the business records exception because the records were compiled in preparation for litiga­
tion. Id. at 670. While the records were eventually admitted under the residual hearsay exception 
found in FED. R. Evm. 807, the fact that the court had to employ such a strained interpretation of the 
hearsay rule and its exceptions demonstrates the danger of such a treatment for computer-generated 
records. 
45. See Molex, Inc. v. Wyler, No. 04 C 1715, 2005 WL 497812, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 
2005) (allowing email evidence under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule); In re 
Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 781 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that emails 
written by a party are admissible as party admissions under the hearsay rule); United States v. 
Boyce, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1082-83 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (holding computer-generated tax assess­
ment forms created for litigation admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule); 
State v. Love, 576 S.E.2d 709, 711-13 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (admitting computer printouts of a 
witness's statement as recorded recollections). 
46. See Orin S. Kerr, Computer Records and the Federal Rules of Evidence, U.S. Arr'vs' 
BULL., March 2001, at 25 (outlining the overall countermovement in some states to view computer­
generated records as a separate form of evidence). As of this Note's publication, these states are 
California, e.g.,  People v. Hawkins, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Ct. App. 2002), Illinois, e. g. , People v. 
Holowko, 486 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. 1985), Kansas, e. g. , State v. Schuette, 44 P.3d 459 (Kan. 2002), 
Louisiana, e. g.,  State v. Armstead, 432 So. 2d 837 (La. 1983), Mississippi, e. g. ,  State v. Dunn, 7 
S.W.3d 427 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), Ohio, e. g . ,  Gray v. Fairview Gen. Hosp., No. 82318, 2004 WL 
527936 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2004), Tennessee, e.g. ,  State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1993), and Texas, e. g. , Ly v. State, 908 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). The only fed­
eral courts that have not followed the majority stance are the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, 
United States v. Rollins, No. ACM34515, 2004 WL 26780 (AF. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 24, 2003), and 
the U. S. Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review, United States v. Duncan, 30 M.J. 1284, 
1288 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1990). 
47. See Hawkins, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642-43 (discussing various states' practices with re­
gard to explicitly delineating between computer-stored and computer-generated records); Armstead, 
432 So. 2d at 839-40 (setting out the terms "computer-stored" and "computer-generated" records 
and noting that computer-stored data must satisfy the business records exception, but computer­
generated data is not dependent on the observations of humans and, therefore, cannot be hearsay). 
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cannot be hearsay because they are "not dependent upon the observations 
and reporting of a human declarant."48 Computer-stored records, on the other 
hand, are deemed the electronic equivalent of handwritten documents.49 
Since they are created or maintained by a human, they are considered state­
ments and must therefore satisfy a hearsay exception in order to be 
admitted.50 Ironically, the non-hearsay stance fits logically into the majority 
of outcomes because it is the logic behind the hearsay rulings that is wrong, 
not the usual result. Therefore, instead of overruling prior cases, these courts 
simply need to recognize the distinction between computer-stored and com­
puter-generated records. 
This Note argues that the minority conception is the proper approach to 
judging computer-generated records' admissibility. The minority approach 
recognizes the true nature of this type of record and is in accordance with 
the overall purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence: accuracy and truth in 
the fact-finding process.51 Part I demonstrates that a distinction exists be­
tween computer-stored and computer-generated records. A majority of 
courts largely ignore this distinction despite contravening precedent from 
several state courts. Part II then explains why computer-generated records­
as opposed to computer-stored records-should not be considered hearsay 
because these records do not fit into the definition of hearsay and they do 
not present the normal dangers associated with such statements. Part III ad­
vocates a test by which judges can distinguish between these two types of 
records. This Part also suggests ways in which federal and state judiciaries 
can reform faulty precedent and avoid the likely obstacles that will arise in 
such an endeavor. 
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMPUTER-STORED AND 
COMPUTER-GENERATED RECORDS AND How IT Is 
IGNORED IN VARIOUS COURTS 
While the split on this issue is quite distinct, it is surprising that more ju­
risdictions have not recognized or even addressed the possibility of different 
types of computer records being introduced at trial. This Section argues that 
there is an important distinction between various types of computer records 
that must be recognized by courts if they wish to practice consistency in 
applying the hearsay rule to proffered evidence, and that hearsay jurisdic­
tions consciously ignore the demonstrated workability of the non-hearsay 
view. 
The crucial distinction that courts should not ignore about computer re­
cords is that some records are computer-stored while others are computer-
48. Armstead, 432 So. 2d at 839-40. 
49. Duncan, 30 M.J. at 1288. 
50. Id. at 1288-89. 
51. See FED. R. Evm. 102 (setting forth accurate factfinding as one of the main purposes of 
the FRE). 
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generated. 52 In essence, computer-stored records are human assertions 
stored in an electronic format.53 These records constitute "assertions" be­
cause they are "the by-product of a machine operation which uses for its 
input 'statements' entered into the machine by out of court declarants."54  
Examples of  this type of record include: word processor files; spreadsheets, 
such as Microsoft Excel files; charts; graphs; and emails.55 Accordingly, 
these records are "statements" and fit easily under the classic definition of 
hearsay. 
Computer-generated records, on the other hand, are records that are 
"self-generated" by the computer.56 This is a sometimes deceptively simple 
definition because human interaction often triggers the computer processes 
that create the records; however, the crucial factor is whether the record is a 
mark of computer activity or if it is the electronically-saved statements of a 
human user. A common example of this type of record is the trace report 
created by a telephone company computer when it monitors calls made to a 
specific phone number.57 When a person dials that number, the computer 
automatically creates the report-no human must assert that the call was 
made in order for the record to be generated. Other examples include ATM 
receipts,58 computer document "meta-data,"59 and internet protocol ("IP") 
logs on computer networks. 
The former, if introduced at trial, fall under the classic definition of 
hearsay while the latter can be likened to original evidence such as finger­
prints, sound recordings, and photographs.6() This distinction affects both 
how the records should be analyzed for admissibility as well as the methods 
attorneys must employ when introducing such records in the first place.61 
Therefore, courts must acknowledge the difference between computer­
stored and computer-generated records in order to accurately judge a re­
cord's admissibility. 
40. 
52. For further discussion on these two terms of art, please see Armstead, 432 So. 2d at 839-
53. Id. at 840. 
54. Id. at 839. 
55. Kerr, supra note 46; Computer-Generated Evidence: The Hearsay Rule and Computer-
ized Evidence, 2 CRIM. PRAC. GUIDE 1, 1 (March 2001) [hereinafter CRIM. PRAC. GUIDE). 
56. 2 McCORMICK, supra note 12, § 294; CRIM. PRAc. GUIDE, supra note 55, at I. 
57. 2 McCORMICK, supra note 12, § 294. 
58. See, e. g . ,  United States v. Duncan, 30 M.J. 1284, 1289 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1990). 
59. See, e. g. , United States v. Rollins, No. ACM34515, 2004 WL 26780, at *9-10 (A.F. Ct. 
Crim. App. Dec. 24, 2003). 
60. Infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
61. If a piece of evidence is not deemed hearsay under FED. R. EvID. 801, then the analyses 
for admitting it at trial fall on authentication, FED. R. EvID. 901, and the evidence's probative versus 
prejudicial value, FED. R. EvID. 403. If both of these qualifications are proven satisfactory to the 
judge, then the proffered evidence should be admitted. Importantly, even admissible hearsay must 
undergo these two steps. Therefore, the consequence of this distinction is that non-hearsay computer 
records do not have to undergo an additional step for being admitted at trial. 
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Almost all federal courts, and most state courts, doggedly ignore this 
distinction, maintaining a "hearsay conception" of all computer-generated 
records. While this hearsay conception appropriately recognizes that there 
are situations where computer evidence constitutes out-of-court assertions, 
opponents believe this view is oversimplified.62 These same opponents aver 
that there are several powerful reasons to distinguish between the two types 
of records, and this is why the hearsay conception cannot be accepted by 
itself. 
II. COMPUTER-GENERATED RECORDS SHOULD 
NOT BE CONSIDERED HEARSAY 
Not only is the distinction between computer-stored and computer­
generated records possible, it is supported by the language and purpose of 
the hearsay rules and vital to promote the policies of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. This Section details the reasons for the non-hearsay view and ar­
gues that they are more persuasive than their hearsay counterparts. 
First, the plain language of the hearsay rule suggests that computer­
generated records cannot be considered hearsay because they are not made 
by a "person"63 and cannot be "statements"64 for the purposes of the rule.65 
Most courts have historically excluded from the hearsay rule "statements" 
made by animals and machines because the nature of their creation does not 
suggest any unreliability.66 It is not clear why computer-generated records 
should be treated any differently. 
State v. Armstead,67 the hallmark case of this non-hearsay view, appro­
priately recognizes this fact and uses it in making the distinction between 
62. Orin Kerr, previously of the Department of Justice's Computer Crime and Intellectual 
Property Section, argues that, as federal courts develop a more "nuanced" view on computer re­
cords, they will be able to see distinctions inherent in the evidentiary issues presented by the various 
types of record. Kerr, supra note 46, at 26. This ability to distinguish records, though, is not cur­
rently present in the way federal courts analyze computer records on the whole. 
63. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(b) states, "A 'declarant' is a person who makes a state­
ment." FED. R. Evm. 80l(b) (emphasis added). Rule 80l(c) then goes on to say, " 'Hearsay' is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. Evm. 80l(c). The Oxford English Dic­
tionary defines a "person" as "a human being regarded as an individual." CONCISE OXFORD 
DICTIONARY 1065 (10th ed. 2002). While far from a legal source, this dictionary's definitions are 
nonetheless taken as persuasive in U.S. courts. See, e.g. ,  Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 
128 (1998). Generally, cases in the U.S. that have dealt with the issue of defining the term "person" 
were brought in order to incorporate either political or corporate bodies into the overarching defini­
tion, or were meant to clarify the term for tax purposes. See, e.g., Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 
182, 190 (1990) (compiling a history of various definitions of the corporate "person"). 
64. See FED. R. Evm. 801(a) (defining the term "statement"). 
65. See, e. g. ,  United States v. Duncan, 30 M.J. 1284, 1288 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1990). 
66. LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 12, at 522. Besides the fact that these types of "statement" 
are not made by a person, the typical reason that courts have excluded animal or machine statements 
from a hearsay analysis is because they are non-assertive. See id. at 517. 
67. 432 So. 2d 837 (La. 1983). 
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computer-stored and computer-generated records.68 In that case, instead of 
entertaining the defendant's claims that prosecutors failed to satisfy the 
business records exception, the court stated that the automatically generated 
telephone call logs at issue were not human statements of any kind.69 After 
noting that computer-stored records are rightly treated as hearsay, the major­
ity then pointed out that records that are not generated by human hands 
cannot be considered a statement within the normal bounds of the hearsay 
rule.70 The underlying rationale of the rule, the court maintained, is to bar 
statements made without an oath that cannot be cross-examined.71 Since 
self-generated records are merely a "record of [the computer's] operations," 
the court reasoned that they could not be statements at all. 72 
Several courts adopted Armstead's interpretation by officially distin­
guishing between computer-stored and computer-generated records and 
implementing the appropriate rules for each.73 The reasoning eventually 
broadened beyond just telephone records, and many different types of com­
puter-generated output soon found acceptance in state courts.74 Eventually, 
in State v. Carter, Louisiana went so far as to say that it would "defy logic" 
to conclude that authenticated computer-generated records could be any­
thing but admissible evidence.75 
Second, none of the traditional rationales for excluding hearsay76 apply 
to computer-generated records. There is no direct testimony with higher 
probative value. It is impossible to increase the accuracy of computer­
generated data by putting the computer under oath, cross-examining it, or 
observing its demeanor. Since computer-generated records are not state­
ments, any worries about accuracy will be remedied by a simple 
authentication of the record and its contents. Furthermore, even if portions 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 839-40. 
71. Id. at 840. 
72. Id. 
73. See, e. g . ,  United States v. Rollins, No. ACM34515, 2004 WL 26780, *9-10 (A.F. Ct. 
Crim. App. Dec. 24, 2003); People v. Hawkins, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 642-43 (Ct. App. 2002); 
People v. Holowko, 486 N.E.2d 877, 897 (Ill. 1985) ("[C]omputer-generated data are different . . . .  
The printouts . . .  are merely the tangible result of the computer's internal operations."); State v. 
Carter, 762 So. 2d 662, 678-80 (La. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 375 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1993). 
74. See, e. g . ,  Hawkins, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (admitting computer 
access logs used to show that the defendant downloaded confidential files at certain times); People 
v. Caffey, 792 N.E.2d 1163 (Ill. 2002) (permitting caller ID records into the record); Gray v. Fair­
view Gen. Hosp., No. 82318, 2004 WL 527936 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2004) (allowing into 
evidence self-generated CAD analyses of the plaintiff's mammogram); Ly v. State, 908 S.W.2d 598 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (admitting printouts of a criminal's movement outside of electronically­
controlled boundaries). 
text. 
75. Caner, 762 So. 2d at 678. 
76. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994); supra note 6 and accompanying 
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of such records are taken out of context,77 the responding attorney can put 
them back in context by introducing the rest of the record. Considering that 
none of the rationales for the hearsay rule relate to authenticated computer­
generated records, traditional justifications for excluding hearsay do not 
apply. 
Third, the non-hearsay view, in line with hundreds of years of Anglo­
American evidentiary precedent,78 advocates distinctions based on the na­
ture, trustworthiness, and probative value of each computer record at issue.79 
This is because lumping wide categories of evidence under the hearsay rule 
requires that they satisfy an exception to the rule, despite the fact that, as a 
category of evidence, they may be as reliable as any other non-hearsay items 
introduced at trial. Such a view is supported by both the hearsay rule's prin­
cipal justifications and more recent additions to the corpus of evidentiary 
law.80 Moreover, these principles accurately judge the probative weight that 
computer-generated records deserve. 
Since the hearsay rule is predicated on the untrustworthiness of out-of­
court statements, 81 the main concern is whether computer-generated records 
are trustworthy if properly authenticated. Several characteristics of these 
records lead to the conclusion that, indeed, they are trustworthy and unde­
serving of the hearsay label. Businesses, the government, and the average 
layperson utilize computer-generated records because they are reliable, and, 
more importantly, they offer an unbiased, accurate portrayal of certain ex­
changes that occur between computers and humans. Computer-generated 
records should thus be considered legally reliable82 because of the nature in 
which they were created and because this same process eliminates any ques­
tion of accuracy beyond a preliminary inquiry into the authenticity of the 
records themselves. 
Any inaccuracies found in computer-generated records are not the type 
the hearsay rule is designed to catch. Whereas a Word document is a 
77. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598. 
78. See 2 McCORMICK, supra note 12, § 53 (outlining the history of Anglo-American juris­
prudence on judicial admissibility determinations). 
79. Id. 
80. American courts do not admit hearsay statements because they are inherently unreliable. 
FENNER, supra note 3, at 4-5. The hearsay rule "expresses the judicial system's preference for the 
real witness, rather than a witness who heard it from the real witness." Id. at 8 (citation omitted). (As 
will be discussed in Section ID.A, infra, this Note's suggested "electronic fingerprints" test demon­
strates why computer-generated records are, themselves, the "real witness.") Thus, probative 
evidence must be adequately authenticated, see People v. Houston, 679 N.E.2d 1244, 1249 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1997), accurate, see State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188 (Tenn. 2001), and easily introduced at trial, 
FED. R. Evm. 401. 
81. Tribe, supra note 5, at 958; cf Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986) (noting that 
hearsay statements are "presumptively unreliable"). 
82. Paul S. Milich, Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolishing the Rule and Staning 
Over, 71 OR. L. REV. 723, 745 (1992) ("Even before the hearsay rule was fully established, courts 
began finding specific situations in which hearsay should be admitted."); see also FENNER, supra 
note 3, at 135 (stating the traditional view that hearsay exceptions are for those types of hearsay 
statements that society at large deems unusually reliable). 
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mechanism for recording assertions made by a person, a computer­
generated record, much like a photograph or sound recording, merely cap­
tures information about the state of the world at a particular moment.83 
Although these records may be inaccurate or misleading, as noted by Judge 
Van Graafeiland in Penna Research, the inaccuracies are best caught by the 
authentication process, rather than by cross-examining the computer itself.84 
Since the ultimate concern in admitting these types of evidence is authenti­
cation, 85 computer-generated records warrant the same treatment. 
Fourth, classifying computer-generated records as hearsay may often 
frustrate the purpose of promoting accurate fact finding86 for computer 
crimes like electronic terrorism, internet stalking, computer trespass, and 
electronic spoliation because it may prohibit highly relevant and trustworthy 
evidence regarding the crime.87 While this is a justification based more on 
policy considerations than it is based on the hearsay rule or evidentiary 
rules, it suggests that the hearsay rule's justifications may be outweighed by 
countervailing interests. Furthermore, this rationale exhibits why it is so 
important to correctly classify computer-generated and computer-stored 
records: computers are used more and more in business and at trial;88 evi­
dentiary rules must keep pace. 
Finally, the core of the hearsay position is based on an outdated concep­
tion of computers and the nature of the records they create, and the minority 
position is not. Penna Research was decided in 1976, and the majority of 
83. See United States v. Rembert, 863 F.2d 1023, 1026-28 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (admitting pho­
tographs as valid reliable "silent witness[es]"); United States v. Slade, 627 F.2d 293, 301 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (holding sound recordings admissible evidence because they were reliable and relevant to the 
defendant's guilt); United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1974); People v. Bowley, 31 
Cal. Rptr. 471, 476 (Cal. 1963). 
84. FED. R. Evrn. 901 advisory committee's note. 
85. FED. R. Evrn. 90l(a); CRIM. PRAc. GUIDE, supra note 55, at l; cf United States v. Simp­
son, 152 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that authentication of properly admissible 
computer records depends on the functioning of the program or process in question). 
86. See Tribe, supra note 5, at 958 (noting that the reason hearsay evidence is excluded is 
because it impedes, rather than helps, factfinding). 
87. The elements of each crime cited obviously rely heavily on computer evidence. For 
example, in a case for computer trespass, 28 U.S.C. § 2701 (a) makes it illegal to access stored elec­
tronic communications if the user is either (1) unauthorized to do so, or (2) exceeds their 
authorization to do so. To extend the example, let us assume the victim in this suit is a business. 28 
U.S.C. § 270l(a) (2000). If the business is unable to provide the records of the unauthorized access 
for any reason (such as deletion, corruption, or other destruction of the records), the only recourse 
may be to utilize records from the accused's computer itself. Since these records are not business 
records and are unlikely to fall under any other hearsay exceptions such as admissions, FED. R. 
Evrn. 80l(d). Similarly, in other cases like computer fraud, 18 U.S.C. § l 030(a)(4) (2000), or extor­
tionate threats, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(7) (2000), private individuals or businesses that do not have the 
proper records are likely unable to bring an adequate suit minus the ability to introduce the defen­
dant's own computer records. 
88. L. Neal Ellis, Jr. et al ., Recent Developments in Trial Techniques, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 
677, 695 (2000); Paul W. Grimm & Claudia Diamond, Low-Tech Solutions to High-Tech Wizanfry: 
Computer-Generated Evidence, 37 MD. B.J. 5, 6 (2004); Gary A. Munneke, Legal Skills For A 
Transforming Profession, 22 PACE L. REV. 105, 128 n.129 (2001). 
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subsequent foundational decisions were handed down twenty years ago.89 
Hearsay courts have not seen fit to question or reexamine these precedents.90 
This is not to say that these results are wrong. In fact, Penna Research and 
its progeny aptly recognize the danger of believing that all computer records 
are admissible and free from hearsay. The current hearsay conception, how­
ever, is based on a notion of computers that does not account for 
independent activity and recordkeeping, which are often free from any hu­
man interaction. 91 Simply delineating between the two types of records 
would allow these courts to keep their current precedent, but also include a 
view of computer records that rightly foregoes a hearsay analysis for trust­
worthy, reliable pieces of evidence contained in computer-generated 
records. 
By contrast, the hearsay view is implicitly rationalized on the premises 
that uniformity in treatment of computer records is desirable,92 the judicial 
process must be efficient, and computer records are ambiguously indefin­
able. 93 While these rationales technically provide the basis for a more 
smoothly-functioning judicial system as a whole, they are overridden in this 
case by the need for accurate factfinding and a consistent hearsay rule. The 
hearsay viewpoint's policy justifications simply cannot excuse the incorrect 
assumption that computer-generated records invariably constitute hearsay, 
especially when such records are highly probative and useful in ascertaining 
the truth. 
A different source of the steadfast adherence to the business and public 
records exceptions might be the wording of the Rules of Evidence them­
selves. Both exceptions incorporate the words "data compilation[s]" into 
their definitions,94 and almost all commentators take this to be synonymous 
with "computer records."95 The hearsay view, however, seems to ignore that 
89. See, e. g., United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Glasser, 
773 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1985). 
90. See, e. g. , United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1317 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Glasser, 773 F.2d at 1557-58); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int'I, LLC, 285 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir. 
2002) (citing Miller, 771 F.2d at 1237); United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561, 568 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(citing Miller, 771 F.2d at 1228); United States v. Stoudenmire, 74 F.3d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1996) (cit­
ing Glasser, 773 F.2d at 1557). 
91. See cases cited supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
92. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (noting 
that a judicial system can only do society's work if it practices a certain level of stare decisis be­
cause to do otherwise is to make law an uncertain and arbitrary practice); Carl Tobias, A Divisional 
Arrangement for the Federal Appeals Courts, 43 ARJZ. L. REV. 633, 656 (2001). 
93. See Roberts, supra note 38, at 279 (discussing the inherent dangerousness computer 
evidence entails because it can combine hearsay and other inadmissible or erroneous data into an 
attractive evidentiary "package"). 
94. FED. R. Evm. 803(6) ("A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form 
. . .  "); FED. R. Evm. 803(8) ("Records. reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form . . .  "). 
95. See CRJM. PRAc. GUIDE, supra note 55; see also United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 
1494 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that it is "well established that computer data compilations are admis­
sible as business records under [FRE] 803(6)"); United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015, 1019 (5th 
Cir. 1987) ("Computer records are admissible if the requirements of Rule 803(6) have been met."). 
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this language does not mean computer records can only be admitted under 
these hearsay exceptions. The threshold question for applying FRE 803(6), 
after all, is whether the evidence in question is even hearsay.96 It seems that 
courts get distracted by the fact that computer-generated records are printed 
on paper and look similar to human-created records,97 despite the fact that 
the nature of their creation and content create an inference of trustworthi­
ness strong enough to avoid a hearsay classification. 
The only reason computers are viewed so distrustfully is because they 
can contain hearsay statements in "packaging" that otherwise looks like 
admissible evidence.98 A means to distinguish between hearsay and non­
hearsay computer records would easily resolve this concem.99 In practice, 
drawing lines between these two types of record is not overly difficult. All 
that is needed is an approach that facilitates understanding of this important 
distinction. 
III. A PROPOSED METHOD TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN 
COMPUTER-STORED AND COMPUTER-GENERATED RECORDS: 
THE "ELECTRONIC FINGERPRINTS" TEST 
As established above, a gray area exists between computer-stored and 
computer-generated records, and it often confuses judges and attorneys 
alike. 100 As with many types of evidence, computer records may be classified 
differently depending on one's point of view. If the court analyzes each por­
tion of a computer record, some parts may be considered computer­
generated and consequently admissible under the various hearsay and evi­
dence rules. For example, if a prosecutor hopes to admit a document found 
on a defendant's computer, the question becomes, must the file's metadata-
96. FED. R. Evm. 803 (''The following [types of hearsay] are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule . . .  ") (list omitted). 
97. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 771  F.2d 1 2 19, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (calling computer 
records "writings" and stating that they will be admitted only if they satisfy the business records 
exception). 
98. Id. 
99. See infra, Part Ill. 
100. Many hearsay jurisdiction cases properly identify records as computer-generated, yet 
then apply the hearsay rule and undertake a business records analysis. See United States v. Cestnik, 
36 F.3d 904, 909 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding computer-generated records admissible because they 
were used to show the amount and origin of fraudulent bank transfers and because they satisfied the 
business records exception); United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209, 2 16  (9th Cir. 1989) ("The record 
was generated automatically . . .  as records of outgoing telephone calls regularly are . . . .  In any 
event, telephone records are business records for the purposes of [FRE] 803(6)."); United States v. 
Miller, 771 F.2d 1 2 1 9, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that computer-generated records are potential 
hearsay because they constitute "writings"); United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1 553, 1 559 (1 1 th Cir. 
1985) (setting out the various situations where computer-generated records are admissible, and all of 
these situations are the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule); United States v. Fusero, 106 F. 
Supp. 2d 921 ,  924-25 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (allowing computer-generated records into the record 
because they were kept in the ordinary course of business). 
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computer-generated, invisible "headers" of most computer files101-be in­
admissible simply because the type of document itself is computer-stored 
data and, therefore, hearsay? If so, and records are viewed as wholes rather 
than as their constituent parts, they may be deemed inadmissible as a re­
sult. io2 
Under current precedent, jurists are frequently unable to distinguish be­
tween the two types of computer records because there is no test on which 
to base an accurate analysis.103 A unified method for distinguishing com­
puter-stored from computer-generated records would resolve this 
controversy. Without such a test, computer records, or parts thereof, that are 
logically admissible but do not satisfy a hearsay exception will be denied 
because they are improperly considered out-of-court statements under out­
dated notions of the nature of computers and hearsay itself. 
In order to facilitate the recognition of the distinction between com­
puter-stored and computer-generated records and to aid judges in the 
admission process of each type of record, this Part argues that courts should 
adopt a conception of computer records wherein records similar to "finger­
prints" are considered admissible as original pieces of evidence. Section 
III.A outlines this "electronic fingerprints" test and describes how it may be 
used. Section 111.B then notes potential obstacles to implementing the non­
hearsay view and electronic fingerprints test, and it offers ways in which the 
transition can best be accomplished. 
A. The "Electronic Fingerprints " Test 
The "electronic fingerprints" test is premised on the distinction between 
computer-stored and computer-generated records, and it outlines an ap­
proach to help judges understand the nature of various computer records, 
which is especially useful when delineating between records that have ele­
ments of both classifications. Computer-generated records are likened to 
fingerprints in this test because of the way that they record the data in ques­
tion. 104 This approach finds support in recent case law and academic 
JOI.  ALAN M. GAHTAN, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 7 (1999). 
102. Cf United States v. Blackbum, 992 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that an other­
wise valid computer-generated report was inadmissible because it was prepared for litigation rather 
than "in the course of regularly conducted business activity"); see also, People v. Chandler, No. 
178600, 1996 WL 33357832, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1996) (upholding, as harmless error, 
the decision to exclude evidence that the accused's computer showed he was logged into his work 
network at the time of the victim's shooting). 
103. See, e.g., United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that computer 
records created by a computer itself are business records); Blackbum, 992 F.2d at 670 (finding a 
computer-generated report inadmissible because it "was not kept in the course of a regularly con­
ducted business activity"); United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553 (I lth Cir. 1985) (holding that 
computer-generated records created for litigation are inadmissible because they are hearsay and 
similarly unable to be authenticated). 
104. Fingerprints are used as evidence because of their ability to accurately demonstrate a 
physical record of a human hand. Ed German, The History of Fingerprints, at http:// 
onin.com/fp/fphistory.html (last updated May 8, 2005). Furthermore, they are often some of the 
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thought,105 and it offers a lens through which courts may finally define the 
true nature of computer-generated output. Most importantly, however, the 
test presents an effective delineation process for courts, thereby helping 
them to avoid the illogical underpinnings that so plague current majority 
precedent on the subject. 
The approach proceeds as follows. First, when computer records are in­
troduced, a judge must ask if the purpose of the records is to establish the 
existence of a transaction by a mechanical or digital object, whether a com­
puter, an ATM card, a telephone number, or some other tangible object. This 
is a threshold question based on judicial economy; it is easy to answer and 
gives an accurate view of the record's likely admissibility in one broad 
swath. If, for example, a prosecutor wishes to introduce an IP log in order to 
demonstrate that the defendant's computer signed on a network at specified 
times, this is presented in order to identify the computer conducting perti­
nent activity on an internet network; therefore, the records are relevant 
based on identification purposes. 
Second, the judge must decide whether the piece of computer evidence 
constitutes an "electronic fingerprint" or, instead, an out-of-court statement. 
In order to accomplish this goal, the judge must evaluate the nature of the 
offered record itself. Specifically, the judge must ask if the record is an as­
sertion or the preservation of an electronic transaction.106 If the record is the 
result of a computer's sole operation, the purpose must be the presentation 
of the transaction in question.107 If there was human interaction, what was 
most probative evidence offered at trial. See, e. g. , K.S. v. State, 814 So. 2d 1 190, 1 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2002) (stating that it is possible for prosecutors to rely solely on fingerprint evidence when 
establishing a defendant's guilt); Browning v. State, 91 P.3d 39, 42 (Nev. 2004) ("[D]efendant's guilt 
was overwhelming given that his fingerprints were at the crime scene . . . .  "); People v. McKenzie, 
768 N.Y.S.2d 8 1 6, 8 1 7  (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) ("Moreover, the fingerprint evidence, standing alone, 
established defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"). Therefore, considerable weight is given 
to these pieces of evidence. Id. 
105. This concept of "electronic fingerprints" is not new; indeed, many commentators-both 
judicial and academic-already use the term to describe the remnants of a computer transaction. See 
Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1 132, 1 146 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Moreover, when we em­
ploy electronic methods of communication we often leave electronic 'fingerprints' behind . . .  that 
can be traced back to us."); Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the F uture: Coping With Discovery of 
Electronic Material, 64 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 253, 264 (2001 )  ("As an initial matter, it would 
seem that these electronic 'fingerprints' should be no more immune to discovery than any other 
material that might be useful in making accurate determinations."); Robert H. McKirgan & Randy 
Papetti, Cheating in the 21st Century, Lrrm., Summer 2001 ,  at 49, 52 ("Unlike paper files, elec­
tronic files even when deleted often leave 'electronic fingerprints' that could reveal when the files 
were deleted."). 
106. See FED. R. Evm. 80l (c); United States v. Breland, 356 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2004); 
McEuin v. Crown Equip. Corp., 328 F.3d 1028, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sallins, 993 
F.2d 344, 346 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Rodriguez-Pando, 841 F.2d 1014, 1020 (10th Cir. 
1988). 
107. See United States v. Rollins, No. ACM345 15, 2004 WL 26780, at *9 (A.F. Ct. Crim. 
App. Dec. 24, 2003) (denying the assertion that computer-generated records are hearsay because 
they are created independently of any human interaction). 
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the assertive quality of the interaction that created the record?108 Essentially, 
this analysis is used to determine whether the record is an assertion or if it is 
the equivalent to the mark left behind when a person holds a tactile object. A 
hearsay analysis is only appropriate in the former case. 
The cumulative result would be: (1) a threshold, traditionally judicial 
question, which-if answered "yes"-leads to; (2) a more searching techni­
cal question. If the answers tend toward less interaction or assertive intent, 
then the record should be classified as "computer-generated" and escape the 
hearsay label. If they tend toward assertive conduct-generally where there 
is significant human interaction-then they should be deemed "computer­
stored" and go through general computer-related hearsay precedent set for­
ward in federal cases. For example, if a prosecutor offers the defendant's 
online journal wherein the defendant admits that he signed on to a network 
at specified times, this obviously deals with human assertions, and, as a re­
sult, the court should apply a normal hearsay analysis. 
Important to the "electronic fingerprints" approach is that judges ana­
lyze the specific part of the record being introduced as evidence under the 
previous two steps. This allows attorneys to break down the record into its 
constituent parts, which are usually a combination of computer-stored and 
computer-generated data. 109 For example, most computer-stored records 
such as Microsoft files and Photoshop images contain metadata,110 which 
can be computer-generated. This metadata records a wide variety of data, 
such as when the file was last opened or modified, the user who accessed 
the file, the computer used, and any actions taken with respect to the file 
(such as printing or emailing it to another computer). A similar example is 
online journals, which contain both types of data combined into one. The 
site's user-created content may be rightfully excluded while the computer­
generated logs of the website itself are admitted into the record. Because of 
computer evidence's highly unified presentation, judges and lawyers alike 
108. See United States v. Duncan, 30 M.J. 1284, 1288-89 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1990) (find­
ing that records of keystrokes or computer-tracked information are not hearsay because the human 
interaction required to make such records is at a minimal level and is not assertive). 
109. Interestingly enough, metadata has become a problem for some businesses because it 
often contains sensitive information that can be retrieved by electronic recipients of the file. An 
especially striking example recently involved England's Prime Minister, Tony Blair who unwittingly 
turned over Microsoft Word documents that contained sensitive information in their metadata. Rich­
ard M. Smith, Microsoft Wont bytes Tony Blair in the butt, at http://www.computerbytesman.com/ 
privacy/blair.htm (June 23, 2003). This data is also very important for normal Internet operation. For 
a discussion of metadata's purpose and definition with respect to Internet documents, see Warwick 
Cathro, Metadata: An Overview (August 1997), available at http://www.nla.gov.au/nla/staffpaper/ 
cathro3.html (last updated Sept. 10, 1997). 
1 10. See Staff, AntiOnline Spotlight: Microsoft Metadata Forensics, ENTERPRISE IT PLANET, 
Mar. 1 1 , 2004, at http://www.enterpriseitplanet.com/security/features/article.php/3324701 (discuss­
ing the functions and prevalence of metadata in Microsoft files); Adobe, Search results 
for "metadata," at http://busca.adobe.com/search?site=AdobeCom&client=AdobeCom&filter=O& 
output=xml_no_dtd&proxystylesheet=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.adobe.com%2Fspecial%2Fsearch%2 
Fadobecomsupport.xsl&restrict=Adobe_com_Train&q=metadata&x=O&y=O (last visited Aug. 1 1 , 
2005). 
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can miss the crucial distinctions that make parts of the evidence admissible 
and other parts barred under the FRE and various court precedents.' ' '  
Finally, in the interests o f  creating as unified a n  approach a s  possible, 
the last step in this proposed approach is to err on the side of caution. If the 
answers to the questions posited above offer no clear determination of the 
records' classification, then judges should simply deem the record "com­
puter-stored" and conduct regular hearsay analysis. In this narrow class of 
cases, courts should rely on the hearsay exceptions. 
An example of the test's utility is found when various types of computer 
records are offered, much like fingerprints, to establish personal identity.112 
Typical examples of this in use are ATM records, phone records, computer 
metadata, and IP logs.113 The common characteristic running through all of 
these instances is that they are used to identify the point of origin for an 
electronic transaction and do not reflect a human assertion. For example, 
phone company records demonstrate the incoming and receiving phone 
numbers of a telephone conversation; 114 IP logs display incoming computer 
signals and how an internet server organizes the flow of data to those com­
puters; 115 and ATM records set down the ATM card used and the time and 
place of the transaction. Therefore, just as real fingerprints are the physical 
record of fingers touching objects, computer-generated records are the elec­
tronic record of computers or human users electronically "touching" other 
116 computers. 
The test thus relies on the premise that content, rather than form, should 
rule.117 Furthermore, if an "electronic fingerprints" analysis deems the re­
cords to be computer-generated, then the only true question left over is 
whether they can also be authenticated. If so, and if there are no other valid 
objections to the evidence, then they should be admissible at trial. 
The "electronic fingerprints" approach delineates the often confusing 
distinction between computer-stored and computer-generated records while 
still allowing truly ambiguous cases to be analyzed under a customary hear­
say approach. Thus, under the test, courts retain their traditional 
1 1 1 .  See FED. R. Evm. 105; Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. B.R.I. Coverage Corp., 38 F.3d 627, 
632 (2d Cir. 1994) ("A business record may include data stored electronically on computers and 
later printed out for presentation in court, so long as the 'original computer data compilation was 
prepared pursuant to a business duty in accordance with regular business practice.' ") (quoting 
United States v. Hernandez, 9 1 3  F.2d 1 506, 1 5 1 2  (10th Cir. 1 990)). 
1 1 2. Stevenson v. United States 380 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1967); cf. State v. Dunn, 7 S.W.3d 
427 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (wherein computer-generated telephone records were used to identify the 
house of origin for certain phone calls). 
1 1 3. Kerr, supra note 46, at 26. 
1 14. See, e.g., Dunn, 7 S.W.3d at 432. 
1 15. See, e.g., United States v. Wagers, 339 F. Supp. 2d 934, 938 (E.D. Ky. 2004). 
1 16. Roberts, supra note 38. 
1 17. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
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discretionary power with respect to questions of admissibility, 1 18 but also 
have an appropriate standard for determining admissibility at trial and judg­
ing plain error or erroneous rulings on computer evidence during appellate 
review. This standard will also provide guidance in an area which desper­
ately needs cohesive thinking. 
B. Addressing Potential P roblems with Reforming Current Majority 
P recedent-Adjusting to the Electronic Fingerprints Test 
Practically speaking, the question remains whether majority courts are 
willing to adapt to the non-hearsay view. While there are obstacles to this 
transition, none present such a barrier as to wholly prevent hearsay courts 
from changing their precedent. Any transition will necessarily be piecemeal, 
but this is certainly attainable despite any problems presented by current 
precedent and practice. 
One major obstacle to reforming the hearsay position is that, even if 
judges are convinced to switch to the non-hearsay view, they may be leery 
of tampering with current precedent because they are unable to tell the dif­
ference between hearsay and non-hearsay computer records. This is not an 
overly distressing problem. Most notably, this is because it is a judge's job 
to make fine distinctions on evidence's admissibility. 1 19 The way to do this 
job and avoid the understandable fear stated above is to educate oneself on 
the nature of the evidence being introduced. To facilitate this process, trial 
judges should adopt the electronic fingerprints approach when analyzing 
computer records. 
The second obstacle to reforming the hearsay position is the view that 
says, "If it ain't broke, don't  fix it." It is true that, with valid authentication, 
most business records and public records will be admitted at trial. 120 More­
over, there are several other ways for most pieces of computer evidence to 
be admitted into evidence even if they are theoretically hearsay. 121 Regard­
less, computer-generated records should still be analyzed as non-hearsay 
evidence. 
1 18. See FED. R. Evm 104(a) (detailing trial courts' extremely broad discretion to determine 
evidence's admissibility). 
1 19. See FED. R. Evm. 104(a) (giving broad powers to judges when determining evidence's 
admissibility). 
120. See FED. R. Evm. 803(6), 803(8). 
1 2 1 .  See Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 5 5  Fed. 0 .  544, 566 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (aJmit­
ting the possibility that emails may be admissible as present-sense impressions if they are shown to 
be authentic and contemporaneous); Vermont Elec. Power Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection 
& Ins. Co., 72 F. Supp. 2d 441 ,  449 (D. Vt. 1999) (holding that a party's emails are admissions for 
the purposes of the hearsay rule); People v. Bynum, 629 N.E.2d 724, 731-32 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 994) 
(stating that computer graphs printed for trial by an expert witness were admissible as materials 
normally used by experts despite their status as hearsay); Kitterman v. Mich. Educ. Employees Mut. 
Ins. Co., No. 247428, 2004 WL 1459523, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. June 29, 2004) (assuming that email 
correspondences of the defendant were admissible as recorded collections). 
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First, the current rule may mask the amount of computer evidence actu­
ally excluded. As some commentators point out, many pieces of potential 
hearsay evidence are not even introduced at trial because the proponent par­
ties suspect they will be denied. 122 Thus, while most computer records are 
admitted at trial, this is likely a case of correlation, not causation. Put differ­
ently, attorneys are likely to only introduce computer records that they know 
will be admissible; to do otherwise would be to risk their credibility in front 
of the judge and jury and, consequently, potentially jeopardize their client's 
case. The status quo is therefore less convincing if argued solely on the ap­
proach' s seeming functionality. 
Second, the system is, in fact, broken. Computer-generated records sim­
ply cannot be hearsay, and the antiquated, stare decisis-fueled hearsay 
viewpoint refuses to recognize this fact. Courts regularly make fine distinc­
tions on what is hearsay and what is not. 123 In order to continue this 
tradition, hearsay courts must make the effort to move beyond an imperfect 
logical basis for their evidentiary decisions. 
These arguments demonstrate why it is baffling that hearsay courts have 
maintained the hearsay position for so long. Besides being internally incon­
sistent with several other important hearsay decisions, 124 the hearsay stance 
discredits the validity of evidence that is extremely probative, non­
prejudicial, and reliable. The challenge that faces these courts is how to 
overcome inertia and arrive at a more coherent and logical position with 
respect to computer-generated records. 
CONCLUSION 
Reformation of the hearsay view will most likely be accomplished 
through small steps, the first of which is to simply establish a compelling 
reason for altering current practice. As this Note demonstrates, there are 
ample bases and reasons for federal-and similarly-aligned state--courts to 
correct decades of erroneous legal precedent. 
Legal precedent must keep pace with technology. Computers play an in­
creasingly large part at trial with each passing year. 125 This is so especially 
because computer-generated evidence is employed in a myriad of situations 
1 22. See, e. g . ,  LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 1 2, at 534 n.4 1 .  
1 23. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 1 1 8-20 ( 1 965) (discussing whether a piece of 
evidence at trial was a personal observation, hearsay, or "hearsay on hearsay"); Adkins v. Brett, 193 
P. 25 1 ,  252-53 (Cal. 1 920) (recognizing that admissible declarations of mental state may nonethe­
less contain inadmissible hearsay recitals of fact); Breedlove v. State, 4 1 3  So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1982) 
("Merely because a statement is not admissible for one purpose does not mean it is inadmissible for 
another purpose."). 
1 24. See, e. g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 
( 1933). 
1 25. See Frank Tuerkheimer, The Daubert Case and Its Aftermath: A Shot-Gun Wedding of 
Technology and Law in the Supreme Coun, 5 1  SYRACUSE L. REV. 803, 804-05 (2001 ). 
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that go well beyond simple business disputes. 126 Judges must therefore deal 
with the introduction of computer-stored and computer-generated evidence 
with ever-increasing frequency. 
As society relies more and more on computers, it necessarily becomes 
h 121 s· ·1 1 d . . d 128 w·th h h more tee -savvy. mu ar y, so o its JU ges. i approac es sue as 
the electronic fingerprints test as well as judges' own experiences in a com­
puter-filled society, understanding of what various pieces of computer 
evidence represent will flourish and lead to a more nuanced and ultimately 
correct process for admitting computer evidence at trial. 
For the reasons discussed above, courts cannot go on simply assuming 
that all computer records are hearsay. Computer-generated records' methods 
of creation, purposes, and uses at trial all point to the conclusion that they 
simply are not human statements of any kind. In light of this fact, the ques­
tion becomes where courts should go from here. An immediate transition to 
the non-hearsay viewpoint, facilitated by the electronic fingerprints test, is 
suggested. Barring this miraculous change in position, however, as previ­
ously stated, the least courts should do is reexamine the basis for their 
conclusions and move beyond the outdated Perrna Research decision. 
It may well be that courts differ on which computer-generated records 
are not hearsay and which constitute a human statement of one form or an­
other. Such is a legal fact of life. However, if the hearsay versus non-hearsay 
analysis is present, then these courts will have made a step in the right direc-
1 26. GAHTAN, supra note 1 0 1 ,  at 2. For example, computer evidence has been used, among 
other reasons, to substantiate allegations of sexual harassment, Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1 327 (7th 
Cir. 1996), prove theft of trade secrets, First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 1 1 F.3d 64 1  (6th Cir. 
1 993), verify the improper use of licensed software, Lauren Corp. v. Century Geophysical Corp., 
953 P.2d 200 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998), and substantiate a wrnngful termination of employment, Kelley 
v. Airborne Freight Corp., 1 40 F.3d 335 ( 1 st Cir. 1 998). 
1 27. COMPUTER LAW 1 -2 (Chris Reed & John Angel eds., 4th ed. 2000); Marc D. Goodman, 
Why the Police Don't Care About Computer Crime, 1 0  HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 467-72 ( 1 997) 
(noting the need for tech-savvy police to respond to the increased numbers of children-and crimi­
nals-who are growing up surrounded by computers); John Grady & Jane Boyd Ohlin, T he 
Application of Title Ill of the ADA to Sport Web Sites, 14 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 145, 1 47-48 
(2004) (recognizing the trend for sports businesses to have cutting edge web sites because more and 
more sports consumers are highly cognizant of the technological realm); Dennis Kennedy, Technol­
ogy Trends: Do We Stand on the Threshold of the Next Legal Killer App?, LAW PRAC. TODAY, Apr. 
2004, at 5, at http://www.abanet.org/lpmllpt/articles/tch0404 l .html (discussing litigation technology 
and modem attorneys' need to utilize and understand it). 
128. Several judges have already taken the step of becoming more computer-savvy. Judge 
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, started a "weblog" in 2004 
with economist Gary Becker. The Becker-Posner Blog, at http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/ (last 
visited Aug. 1 1 , 2005). This familiarity with computers has also become evident in written opinions. 
For example, in United States v. Hill, Judge Alex Kozinski stated, "As everyone who has acciden­
tally erased a computer file knows, it is fairly easy to make mistakes when operating computer 
equipment." 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081 ,  1 089 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (sitting by designation pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 29 1 (b)). Another such example is found in In re Search of 381 7 W. West End, First Floor 
Chicago, Illinois 60621, in which the federal district court, of its own volition, suggested that a 
technical expert search computer files' "metadata" for pertinent information to the case. 321 F. 
Supp. 2d 953, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2004). As these cases (and Judge Posner's weblog) suggest, judges are 
gaining a more than passing knowledge of computers and their inner workings with each passing 
year. 
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tion. Computer records are not a class of evidence with a uniform face. If a 
court is able to make the logical step and recognize that various records dif­
fer in nature based on their characteristics, then the purpose of both the 
hearsay and the Federal Rules of Evidence will finally be realized, at least 
with respect to computer records. 
1 74 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104: 1 5 1  
